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ABSTRACT 
The economic recovery program proposes to inject about $100 
billion into the aggregate spending stream while simultaneously reducing 
the inflation rate. Careful analysis of estimates of the supply response 
to tax rate reductions and deregulatron show that output increases will 
not balance the increas~d demand. Savings rates several times historic 
levels are thus necessary not only to reduce inflation, but even to 
prevent the program from worsening inflation. Recent evidence indicates 
that none of the scenarios most often mentioned as producing the 
requisite savings hold much promise. 
THE ADMINISTRATION'S "PROGRAM FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY": 
THEORY AND EVIDENCE 
Can reductions in personal tax rates increase output without contri-
buting further to inflationary pressures? In large part, this is the 
promise of the new Administration's "Program for Economic Recovery." 
The package is of rather dramatic design - - across-the-board tax reduction 
coupled with sweeping budget cuts. However, the relative magnitudes of the 
tax and budget cuts being proposed appear to represent a net stimulus of 
roughly $100 bill ion over the 1982-1984 period. 1 When spending cuts are 
significantly less than tax cuts, additional developments must fol low if 
the potential increase in aggregate spending is not to be inflationary. Two 
such developments are most often discussed. 
The first is that the tax cuts will be saved. Given the magnitude of 
the stimulus involved, the non-inflationary savings rate out of tax reductions 
would have to be in excess of forty percent. If inflation is to be signifi-
cantly reduced, the savings rate must be even greater. On this point, the 
architects of the package have been quite candid, speculating that one-half 
. 2 to two-thirds of the tax cuts w111 be saved. Nonetheless, skeptics empha-
size that traditional savings rates have been well below ten percent of 
disposable income. Though there is some basis for disputing this statistic, 
3 even revisionist estimates hardly approach the requisite savings rate. 
The second possibility is, of course, the supply response. Sharp 
increases in output can buffer increased spending and alleviate upward 
price pressure. To further this end, investment tax incentives are being 
recommended. However, capital stock expansion is not an instantaneous process. 
L 
Consequently, a significant share of the required output increase must occur 
before new investment has had time to augment the capital base. Moreover, 
such capital deepening requires extra savings up front to permit the requisite 
diversion of resources. Hence, this portion of the supply response is not 
only deferred beyond the short run period considered here, but is also 
dependent on the demand side response. 
Real output growth has been hampered also by wasteful over-regulation 
of business. It follows then that the elimination of unproductive and thus 
costly regulation taps a reservoir of real output~ However, like capital 
formation, the output response to regulatory reform may have its own special 
time dimension. Basic microeconomic theory suggests that the magnitude of a 
short run output response depends upon the distribution of compliance costs 
between variable and fixed cpmponents. 
In the near term, therefore, perhaps output expansion relies largely 
upon increased labor force participation. Clearly, it is to this prospect 
that the proposed personal tax rate cuts are largely addressed. The logic 
is straightforward - - give individuals a larger after-tax share of what they 
produce and they may wel 1 produce more. Indeed, there is empirical support 
4 
for this proposition. Nevertheless, emphasis on the labor supply response 
to lower tax rates does not suspend their demand side implications. Keynesian 
policies have run into trouble for having ignored essential supply side 
considerations. Certainly advocates of supply side policies would do well 
to avoid simply inverting that error. 
In short, if the proposed personal tax cuts are to be consistent with a 
reduction in inflation in the near term, there must be a swift and significant 
change in aggregate savings behavior and/or a commensurate short run increase 
in real output. This paper examines the prospects for such short run 
developments. Part I models the inflationary potential of the net demand 
stimulus. Part I I examines several scenarios under which a jump in personal 
savings might occur and thus forestall the prospect of tax-induced price 
pressure. Part I I I examines the impact which the proposed tax cuts can have 
on the supply side. This paper, by clarifying the nature Qf the supply response 
to the Administration's proposals, estimates the adjustment in aggregate savings 
necessary if the program is oot to contribute to inflati on. 
The Demand Stimulus 
This section models the demand side response to across-the-board tax 
cuts coupled with a smaller federal spending reduction. The standard macro-
economic model provides a f~amework within which to highlight the various 
relationships which must change if the net fiscal stimulus is not to be 
· f 1 • 5 1n at1onary. 
The attainment of equilibrium in the injection/withdrawal process is 
depicted in Figure la. The rate of withdrawal from current income is a 
function of the savings rate (s), tax rate (t), and import rate (m). The 
level of withdrawals (W) is the withdrawal rate (w) times real output (Q) 
wh e re w = [ s ( 1 - t ) + t + m ] Injections (A) consist of planned investment, 
government spending, exports, and autonomous taxes and consumption. Figure 
lb adds the money market and thus incorporates the effects of interest rates 
into the analysis. Figure le considers the role of price level changes. 
The short run aggregate supply curve (SS) is drawn positively sloped for the 
6 
usual host of reasons. Changes in aggregate demand (DD) thus influence 
the price level and real output. 
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The tax cut is shown in Figure la as a downward rotation of the with-
drawal function from w Q tow Q. A simultaneous cut in federal spending 
o 1 
reduces the level of autonomous injections from A to A'. Combined, these 
0 0 
fiscal measures move the economy to output level Q'. In view of the relative 
0 
magnitudes of the tax and budget cuts cited previously, note that this depiction 
is qualitatively consistent with the idea of a net stimului. In Figure lb, 
the tax cut appears as an outward rotation of IS to IS'. 
0 0 
Endogenous responses to the pol icy stimulus work to reduce the amount 
of output increase noted above. Given a money supply and price level, the 
spending rate increase pushes interest rates from r to r 11 • Some private 
0 0 
investment is thus crowded out by induced consumption, so autonomous spending 
fa 11 s from A I to A11 • In the absence of any price change, the proposed 
0 0 
fiscal measures would position the economy at the intersection of IS and 
1 
LM, at output Q11 and interest rate r 11 • However it is evident from Figure le 
O O 0 
that the aggregate demand shift from 00 0 to DD1 creates excess demand at the 
existing price level P . The rise to the market clearing price level P 
o 1 
reduces the real money supply thus shifting LM to LM in Figure lb. 
O 1 
Observe that the interest rate rises again, this time to r 1 and hence private 
investment falls still further, from A" to A. Accordingly, output falls 
0 1 
from Q~ to Q1 . Consideration of the exogenous and endogenous impacts of the 
tax and budget cuts, finds the economy at higher price and output levels P 
1 
and Q with a higher interest rater and lower autonomous spending A1• 1 1 
Quantitatively, the net demand stimulus shown here amounts to a roughly 
$170 b . l l. . ? 1 10n increase. 
Precluding the inflationary impact described above requires one of three 
developments: l) short-circuiting the net stimulus on the demand side through 
say, adjustments in savings or interest rates; 2) meeting the demand with 
6 
sufficient real output expansion on the supply side; or 3) some appropriate 
combination of these two factors. However, it is important to recognize 
that the magnitudes of the necessary adjustments vary significantly depending 
on whether they are made on the demand or supply side. For example, savings 
adjustments need only match the size of the initial stimulus in order to offset 
it. On the other hand, if extra after-tax income is not sa~ed, the compensating 
supply response will have to be much larger owing to the fact that the net 
stimulus, when spent, induces a multiple increase in demand. The next 
section explores arguments holding that savings will rise to squelch the net 
stimulus on the demand side. Part I I I then estimates an upper limit to the 
size of the supply response that can be expected. 
Defusing the Demand Stimulus 
It wi 1 l be convenient to ignore initially the possibi 1 ity of real output 
increases. This section considers only potential change in aggregate savings 
behavior which can offset the net stimulus described previously. The three 
most plausible scenarios under which aggregate savings might rise appreciably 
are: I) altered inflationary expectations based entirely upon the whirlwind 
policy shift of the new administration; 2) altered inflationary expectations 
based on the actual observance of improving price stability; or 3) a significant 
decline in durable goods purchases. 
In terms of the model, all three of these developments may be depicted 
as a reduction in autonomous spending. Observe in Figure 2 how the autonomous 
spending decline from A1 to A1 leads to a shift of the aggregate demand curve 
fr-0m DD to DD'. Note that price and output return to the original level and 
1 1 
thus the pol icy has been neither inflationary nor expansionary. While the 
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disinflationary impact of increased savings is clear graphically, the pros-
pects for this occurrence under each savings scenario warrants examination. 
Altering Expectations~ Faith. The Reagan policies represent a rather 
dramatic ideological shift, and possibly, it is the drama of the gesture alone 
which can be counted on to dampen the public's inflationary expectations. 
Indeed, the administration has acknowledged that the ability to foster 
improved expectations is a si9nificant coeffic i ent in its pol icy equation. 
However, for the public to accept on faith the disinflationary promise of the 
new economic package, it seems people must hold two rather prominent notions. 
First, the public must really believe that government spending is a genuine 
and major factor in the existing inflation. Second, observers must be con-
vinced that government spending in excess of a noninflationary level truly 
wi 11 be eliminated. While on the former point there may wel I be pub I ic unanimity, 
on the latter there is surely skepticism. This is certainly not the first 
Administration ostensibly dedicated to balancing the budget. Moreover, deficit 
spending is still projected for the early years of the program. Clearly, 
securing public confidence in the future spending habits of the federal government 
wi 11 require quite a sales effort. 
Unfortunately, the sales task facing the Administration is a rather 
delicate one. Certainly, the permanent tax cuts which are being proposed, 
if passed, could strengthen the public's perception of a reformed government 
sector. However, curiously enough, the permanence of the tax pol icy might 
also prove counterproductive in the effort to encourage savings. Independently 
of improved expectations, people may adjust their spending to what is per-
ceived as a permanent increase in their income. The upward revision in expected 
permanent income could thus result in less private savings than would have 
occurred had only inflat i onary expectations changed. Seen in this I ight, 
correctly targeting the necessary sales pitch is no simple matter. 
Reliance entirely upon persuasion and the public's good faith to 
reverse inflationary expectations is perhaps quite a long shot. Surely 
9 
we recall the reception accorded President Ford's WIN buttons, although one 
might argue that President Reagan is a more charismatic leader operating in 
the slip stream of a strong electoral mandate. Nonetheless, given the imbued 
consciousness of inflation, it seems more probable that the public, hopeful 
as it may be, might wel 1 adopt a wait-and-see attitude. In short, savings 
rates are more 1 ikely to change only after people have seen inflation begin 
to abate. 
Altering Expectations Through Tig~t Money. Should the public require tangible 
proof of improving price stability, the role of the Federal Reserve System 
becomes critical. The Fed must act to encourage the expectation of price 
stability. This can only mean a pol icy of tight money. Of this point, the 
Administration is well aware, and in fact, in complete agreement. However, 
reliance on tight money raises two potential problems. First, the very tight 
money pol icy necessary to dampen inflationary expectations wi 11 also operate 
via interest rates to frustrate the longer-term goal of encouraging capital 
accumulation. The second consideration is simply whether the Fed has 
sufficiently precise control over the money supply to effect a stable, tight 
money course. 
The problem that tight money creates for longer-term growth is depicted 
graphically in Figure 3. In Figure 3c, DD represents the after-tax demand 
1 
curve which caused price and output to rise initially from P to P1 and 
0 
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Q to Q, respectively. It is this price increase which the Fed must counter. 
0 1 
The Fed's monetary restraint is shown by an inward shift of the LM curve from 
LM' to LM11 in Figure Jb. Accordingly, the DD curve in Figure 3c shifts back 1 1 
to DD111 which yields price P\' consistent with price P0 • Note, however, that 
output has also fallen to Q~. This decline in output which f61lows from tight 
money can have rather significant implications regarding longer term growth 
and capital accumulation. As indicated in Figures 3a and 3b, the reduction 
in demand has been accomplished via higher interest rates, r~ versus r;, and 
thus lower levels of auton0mous spending, A111 rather than A1. It is thus 
important to consider precisely what type of borrowing is likely to be 
crowded out, consumers or producers. To the extent that it is the latter, 
• 
tight money achieves the necessary price stability at the expense of longer 
term capital formation. Of course, some of the crowding out can be offset by 
accelerated depreciation allowances and corporate income tax reductions. 
Recently, Mr. Weidenbaum has suggested the possibility of an offsetting 
8 increase in velocity, the number of times each dollar is spent annually. 
In this event, the shift of LMi to LM~ in Figure 3 would be eliminated as 
would the rise in interest rates. However, for nominal GNP to grow at the 
proposed ll,5 percent annual rate, while MIB grows at only a 4.5 percent 
target rate, velocity must increase by 31 percent over the 1980-1984 period. 
So dramatic an increase in velocity seems hard to imagine given that during 
9 
the previous four year period velocity rose only 17 percent. Moreover, 
even if the requisite change in velocity does occur, the revised prospects 
for growth come at the expense of continued inflation. 
The implications of tight money described above presupposes that the Fed 
is, in fact, able to institute such a pol icy. However, recent data on the 
12 
money supply suggests that this may not be such a reasonable assumption. 
Recall that in October of 1979, Chairman Volcker adopted a new policy tack. 
Rather than attempting to peg money market rates, the Fed shifted its focus 
to control! ing monetary aggregates. Figure 4 tracks the behavior of MIB 
10 
at monthly intervals for the period l/79 to 12/80 Given the new pol icy 
directive initiated on October 6, 1979, one might anticipate smal ]er fluctuations 
in the monetary aggregates thereafter. Figure 4 indicates just the opposite 
in fact occurred. It seems ironic, to say the least, that the Fed's new 
policy of targeting monetary aggregates has resulted in even more erratic 
movements in MIB. Arguably, this observation may be nothing more than evidence 
of early pangs of adjustment. Perhaps the Fed's new pol icy wil 1 take many 
months before its full impact shows up in terms of smoother movement in the 
monetary aggregates. Nevertheless, the data indicate quite clearly that the 
Fed is not completely in control, and thus should not be counted upon too 
heavily to fulfill its counter-inflationary role of tight money with great 
precision. 
Shift in Durable Goods Consumption. Neither of the two scenarios under 
which perceptions of price stability might be fostered - a super sales job 
by the Administration or an effective tight money pol icy - seem to hold a 
promise that would comfort a pol icy maker. Now consider a quite different 
scenario under which tax cuts might be saved. So called "bracket creep", 
in conjunction with the scheduled increases in social security taxes, could 
effectively wash out the additional disposable real income currently in 
' prospect. If this is the case, it may be more appropriate to interpret the 
tax cut as temporary. Under a permanent income hypothesis, temporary tax 
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reductions are viewed as transitory income and thus wind up entirely in 
savings. This interpretation wo~ld appear to lend considerable support to 
the Reagan assumption that a large part of the tax cut will be saved. Bear 
in mind, however, that in the specification of the permanent income hypo-
thesis, savings is defined to include durable goods purchases. It seems, 
then, that an argument must be made supporting the likelihood that a tax 
cut will not go toward increased durable goods purchases. Clearly, disin-
flation requires that it be saved in the more traditional s~nse of the term. 
In recent Congressional testimony, Professor Rutledge has argued 
• I h" • ll H . . h h • d" . precise y t 1s point. e ma1nta1ns tat t e current economic con 1t1ons 
are such that we can expect a general decline in durable goods purchases. 
The logic of Professor Rutledge's argument appears to be as follows. 
During the inflationary experience of the past four years, households may 
have been inclined to invest heavily in durable goods as a hedge against 
inflation. Why should this hedge take the specific form of durable goods 
purchases rather than other consumer goods or financial assets? First, 
durable goods are storable where consumer services and non-durables are not. 
Second, unlike many financial assets, durable goods are purchasable out of 
future rather than current income and wealth. In short, durable goods may be 
the common man's hedge against inflation. Given the recent history of infla-
tion, households may be currently in a situation where they discover them-
selves holding an abnormally high level of durable goods inventories. One 
might then expect households to live off these inventories in the near future 
12 
and thus not spend the tax cut on durable goods. · 
Rutledge's scenario has some appeal. Its credibility, however, relies 
on two empirical issues. First, is consumer durable expenditure characterized_ 
by cycles which may interpreted as inventory accumulation and depletion? 
15 
Second, if so does the economy at the present time appear to be in a phase 
of the cycle amenable to Inventory depletion? That is, are we moving out of 
a perlod of accumulation as Professor Rutledge suggests? 
In order to address these questions, we must first construct a variable 
capable of detecting this possible phenomenon of durable goods inventorying. 
For this purpose we chose the ratio of durable to non-durable consumer ex-
penditure. This ls an obvious measure of durable inventorying due to the 
simple fact that non-durable goods are not· storable, as a rule. Furthermore, 
the major non-durable purchases such as food and clothing are for the most 
part necessity goods and therefore are nondiscretionary purchases. This 
suggests that non-durable purchases are the most stable component of the 
consumption function. The stability of this component justifies its use as a 
reference point around which to m~asure fluctuation in the purchases of 
durable goods. The like I ihood that durable purchases will vary follows from 
the idea that durable goods tend more to be luxury items and therefore are 
purchased out of discretionary income. • The interpretation of this variable 
is straightforward. A rise in the ratio indicates that durable inventories 
are being accumulated, a decline indicates depletion. 
The question of whether there exists a durable purchases inventory cycle 
was addressed simply by plotting quarterly movements in the actuaJ durable-
non-durable ratio for the period 1960-1980 relative to its base trend. The 
residual plot appears in Figure 5. Casual inspection of the graph confirms 
the general idea of a durable inventory cycle, although there are a number of 
implications to this plot which should also be noted. First, the durable 
inventory cycle is highly correlated with the business cycle. Second, the 
amplitude of the inventory cycle appears to be greater in the ?O's than in 
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the 60's. In a modest sense, the increased amplitude of the inventory 
cycle lends tentative support to Rutledge's scenario. Since the 70's were 
generally a mor~ inflationary period, perhaps the greater amplitude is re-
flecting the use of durables as an inflationary hedge. But, perhaps not. 
13 Clearly, there are other plausible explanations. However, what is of 
empirical interest is not the explanation of the durable inventory cycle. 
Rather, it is the question whether such a cycle exists. The data indicate 
quite clearly that it does. 
The second critical empirical issue in Rutledge's scenario is whether 
we appear to be in a phase of the inventory cycle amenable to inventory 
depletion. Judging from the, graphs, the answer here is a resounding "perhaps 
yes, but probably not. 11 From the fourth quarter of 1975 until the fourth 
quarter of 1978 there was a sustai~ed increase in the durable/non-durable 
ratio. However, with the first quarter of 1379, the ratio falls again, thus 
suggesting durable inventory depletion. This depl~tion appears to end during 
the second quarter of 1980 with the rest of that year suggesting a renewed 
upward trend in relative durable goods expenditure. Though one can hardly 
project a continuing trend from two quarters observations, it is possible to 
say with some certainty that durable stocks are not at the peak of an inventory 
cycle. It is, of course, a peak which would have to be evident presently for 
Rutledge's scenario to seem most pefsuasive. Only if most of the excess 
inventory acquired prior to 1979 remains serviceable and wil I be depleted 
over the 1982-1984 period does this scenario for reduced spending seem 
plausible. 
The thrust of Part I I can now be summarized. First, if a net tax 
stimulus is not to be inflationary 1 it must be saved. To an unknown and 
perhaps minor extent, such savings may be forthcoming simply if people are 
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convinced that the new Reagan program will be effective. Here, clearly, 
salesmanship is important. It is unrealistic, however, to ignore the 
possibilfty that the public must be given more concrete evidence that inflation 
will slow. This places considerable responsibility with the Fed. There must 
be tight money. At this point the logic lapses in two respects. If monetary 
policy is effective, the resulting price stability may be ~chieved only at 
the expense of higher interest rates and thus less capital accumulation. 
Alternatively, reflection on the recent history of monetary policy indicates 
that the Fed cannot necessarily be counted on to tontrol the money supply. 
This implies that, as people spend the tax cut, inflation continues and thus 
reduces any incentive to save the cut in the first place. Finally, we 
considered that households might save most of the tax cut if currently they 
are overstocked with durable goods. However, recent evidence on the relative 
level of existing stocks does ndt lend plausibility to this hypothesis. It 
would seem then, despite fervent hope to the contrary by most everyone, 
disinflationary demand side developments are less than certain prospects. 
The Supply Response 
To this point, the near term avoidance of inflation in the face of 
a net stimulus has been treated as requiring an increase in personal savings. 
Certainly, the anti-inflation claim for the new pol icy is based on more than 
this. Extra income that is spent rather than saved need not be inflationary 
if matched by output increases. This increase must occur quickly, however, 
if the net stimulus does induce a spending surge. Furthermore, once the income 
injection has escaped into spending the multiplier effect implies that the 
output expnasion must be larger than the injection in order to prevent upward 
1 ) 
price pressure. 
The immediacy of the necessary supply response precludes reliance on 
capital accumulation to provide the productivity increase. In the nearer 
term, output expansion would most likely come from two sources: l) more 
people choosing to work more hours in the market economy; and 2) elimination 
of unproductive regulation. This section explores the probable magnitudes 
of these short run supply responses. 
Increased Labor Force Participation. While tax cuts retain their demand side 
implications, economists have been correct as of late to emphasize the impacts 
that tax cuts can also ha~e on labor force participation. Progressive marginal 
tax rates mean progressively lower after-tax wages on additional hours worked. 
As a result~ the real price of leisure relative to labor declines, and Indivi-
duals tend to substitute leiiure for labor. It follo0s, then, that marginal 
tax cuts could reverse the trend in the price of labor ielative to leisure 
and thus encourage labor force participation. This theoretical proposition 
has, in fact, been confirmed in numerous empirical studies. The consensus 
of this literature appears to be that a one percent change in marginal tax 
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rates will cause a 0.2 percent change in hours worked. If we consider the 
10 percent tax reduction currently being proposed for 1982, we might antici-
pate a two percent increase in hours worked, or roughly one additional week 
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annually per employed worker. 
It seems reasonably clear then - - tax cuts can increaie real output 
simply because they provide people with the incentive to work more. However, 
it is inaccurate to envision this entire real output increase as a net gain 
capable of offsetting ·the demand increase discussed previously. In fact, 
a substantial portion of the increased output which ensues from increased 
20 
labor force participation goes to meet demand which is induced independently 
of the initial demand stimulus associated with the tax cut. 
To see this point, consider the meaning of the term leisure as it is 
used in national income accounting. Leisure is that amount -0f time for which 
the individual is not engaged in market production, that is, output that wi 11 
be measured in the national income accounts. Within this broad notion of 
leisure, it is then useful to view the individual as leisuring either in the 
pure recreational sense or engaged in "household production." This latter 
component of leisure is believed to be particularly sensitive to the marginal 
16 
tax cons i de rat i•ons. 
The argument is an intuitively appealing one. Consider an accountant 
for whom a well-maintained yard figures prominently in the utility fu~ction. 
' Assuming the accountant does not ' loath yard work, he faces a pure economic 
choice. He either does his own yard work and thus engages in household 
production, or he uses a lawn service and thus allocates. earned income to 
purchase market production. The relative prices that figure in his decision 
are significantly afjected by the marginal tax rates. The accountant surely 
recognizes that if he hires the lawn service, he must pay a pre-tax wage with 
his own post~tax income. Moreover, since the decision is between spending 
!ive more hours a week accounting versus five more hours of household pro-
duction, the extra hours of market production and, equivalently, earned income, 
are taxed at the highest marginal rate. If instead the accountant does his 
own yard work, he in effect provides, as well as receives, yard services tax 
free. It is in this sense that excessively high marginal tax rates are 
understood to drive a "wedge" between the demanders and suppliers of market 
goods and services. It is thus argued that lowered marginal tax rates will 
induce individuals to substitute market for household production. In this way, 
real output as measured in the national i~come accounts will rise. However, 
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the crucial conclusion that may be wrought from this anecdote is that, 
while measured output has risen as a result of tax cuts, so too has the demand 
for that output. Indeed, the decision to work in the market economy is 
simultaneously a decision to replace previous household production with market 
expendJture. This logic suggests that the supply response to marginal tax 
cuts might be washed out completely by the concomitant demand response. This 
is probably not the case. Clearly, to the extent that tax cuts move labor 
from household to market production, there are gains in productivity owing 
purely to increased specialization. 
In addition .to the substitution of market for household production, 
it is also 1 ikely that an accountant will opt for work over recreation. 
This shift is a second substitutron effect through which real measured output 
' may rise. However, once again it 'is incorrect to view the output increase 
entirely as a net gain capable of stemming inflation. The deci .sion to 
consume recreation rather than earn income implies a preference for recreation 
at least equal to the value of market goods that could have been purchased 
with after-tax income. If an individual moves from recreation to labor as 
a result of marginal tax cuts, he must replace the foregone satisfaction 
previously obtained through recreation with additional consumption. 
Casting this anecdote in more quantitative terms, permits ai least an 
intuitive estimate of the magnitude of real net output increases which are 
likely to follow from marginal tax reductions. Suppose our accountant grosses 
$25.00/hr. or, assuming a 2000 hour work year, $500,000/yr. Currently, earned 
income of this amount is taxed at a 50 percent marginal rate. A 10 percent 
rate cut induces an additional forty hours labor over the year. Obviously, 
these additional forty hours are drawn from leisure. For ill .ustrative ease, 
... i. 
assume that the accountant substitutes equally from household production 
and recreation in favor of labor. 
Table l presents the output and expenditure accounting for the labor-
leisure substitution which follows from tax cuts in the highest tax bracket. 
Twenty fewer hours of both household production and recreation each transfer 
into $500 more earned income. These two $500 income increments are then taxed 
at the new 45 percent marginal rate leaving $275 of additional after-tax 
income. A portion of this income must go to purchase market output to 
compensate for either foregone recreation or foregone household production. 
The amount of this expenditure or market output must be at least $251 in each 
case. If this were not the 1mplicit value, the accountant would have been 
working more and leisuring less at the original 50 percent marginal tax rate. 
The net income gain is thus $24. , In the case of substituting household 
• 
production for market production, this net gain may be attributed to the 
specialization which the market affords. In the recreation substitution, 
the net $24 simply reflects that additional hours worked in the market are 
taxed less and thus more after-tax income is received. It seems reasonable 
that part of this net gain would be spent. However, to set a maximum on 
the output expansion available to offset the demand stimulus of Part I, 
we assume it is all saved. 
The other parts of the withdrawal from the extra income are the two 
$225 increments to government tax revenue. Recent experience would indicate 
that all of this would be reinjected into the spending stream, thus not 
permitting an anti-inflationary or net addition to purchasable output. The 
recovery program, however, calls for federal spending to grow at a slower 
rate through 1984 than federal tax receipts (5.42 percent annual rate versus 
17 8.68 percent annual rate) . . Hence, the governmental marginal propensity 
TABLE 1: Output-Expenditure Accounting, 50% Tax Bracket 
HOUSEHOLD ACCOUNTING 
PRODUCTION EXPLANATION RECREATION 
g w E Q w E 
$500 Gross income $500 
$-225 ..• Tax @ 45% marginal rate $-225 
$275 After tax income $275 
$-,251 ... Expenditure compensation ... $-251 
on foreg_one leisure utility 
$ 24 Income oain due to 
market sp~cialization 
Income qain due to 
recreation substitute ... $ 24 
---
$ 251 Indu'ced private $ 25i 
expenditure 
$ 249 Induced Nithdrawals .... $ 249 
$ 140 ... Planned public $ 140 
· expenditure 
$ 391 Total expenditure $ 391 
$500 · Induced output $500 
21.8% Net addition to output 21.8% 
as percentaqe of 
increased hours worked 
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to spend of 1 .00 might be reduced to 0.6. Applying this factor, government 
spends $140 out of the expected extra $225 in taxes. 
Combining the induced private and planned public spending increases, 
it should be clear that, for every $500 worth of increased output provided 
by those in the top tax bracket, there ensues at least $391 worth of addi-
tional spending. In other words, for every additional hour worked by the 
relatively rich, only 22 percent of the additional output can be viewed 
as a net "supply-side" response. Table 2 repeats the computations of Table 
for an individual assumed to be in the $25,000/year, 32 percent marginal 
tax bracket. Only 13.5 percent of the additional output by an individual 
in this situation is a net gain. 
Comparison of Tables I and 2 indicate that the net supply-side response 
falls wfth base income. B~cause the marginal personal tax rate for the 
economy as a whole has been computed at just under 32 percent, the hypothetical 
taxpayer depicted in Table 2 may be viewed as representative of the entire 
18 distribution of .taxpayers. Hence, only about 13.5 percent of the output 
from extra market activity will be available to offset the added spending 
arising from the personal tax cuts. 
The analysis thus far is summarized in Figure 6. A tax rate change 
rotates the economy's aggregate demand curve out from DD0 to DD1 along the 
original aggregate supply curve SS0 • Thi~ ~reduces price level P1 and output 
Q1. However, recognizing that tax cuts also induce the substitution of labor 
for leisure, we must incorporate these labor supply effects into the analysis. 
The shift from SS to SS represents the entire supply response .. As indicated 0 4 
in Tables I and 2, this supply response is composed of three parts: I) the 
pure substitution for household production, (SS to SS ); 2) the pure substi-
o 2 
tution for recreation, (ss2 to ss3); and 3) the net income gains associated 
25 
TABLE 2: Output~Expenditure Accounting, 32% Tax Bracket 
HOUSEHOLD ACCOUNTING 
PRODUCTION EXPLANATION RECREATION 
Q w E Q w E 
$250 Gross income $250 
$ 72+ . . . Tax@ 29% ... $ 72+ 
$177+ ... Afier tax income $177+ 
$171 .•. Expenditure compensation ... $171 
@ 68% 
$ 6+ ... Income qain due to 
ma~ket specialization 
Income qain due to 
recreation substitute ... $ 6+ 
0 
$171 ... Induced private spendinq ... $171 
$ 79 Induced withdrawals ... $ 79 
$ 45+ .... Planned public spending ... $ 45+ 
$216+ Total expenditure $216+ 
$250 Induced output $250 
13.5% Net addition to output 13.5% 
as percentage of 
increased hours worked 
Price 
Level 
p 
p - -l 
p - - · 4 
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with market specialization and recreation substitution, (SS to SS ). 
3 4 
If there is no induced expenditure accompanying increased labor force 
" participation, then the economy could move to output Q at the original 
0 
price level P . This may be what the Administration envisions. However, 
0 
as the discussion in this paper has indicated, this is an incomplete 
depiction of the adjustment process. Foregone household production and 
recreation invite replacement demand for market output. ThLs induced demand 
is reflected in the shifts from 001 and DD3, respectively. Clearly, while 
increased labor force participation contributes to market output, it 
simultaneously spurs demand. A final shift to DD incorporates the addi-
4 
tional spending associated with federal spending. 
The point of the foregoing analysis is that at best Only 13.5 percent of 
the increased hours of labor force 'participation make a net contribution to 
market output. Hence, the previously cited labor supply elasticity should be 
adjusted downward to .027 to capture only the anti~inflationary element of 
the tax cut. This information now permits an estimate 6f the aggregate net 
output response. In 1981, just under 170 billion man-hours are expected to 
produce a GNP of $2,920 billion. 19 A 0.27 percent annual increase in hours 
worked would suggest a nominal output increase of $8.72 billion the first 
20 21 
year . Over three years the total is $58.75 bill ion. This represents only 
about one-third of the policy's net spending increase of $170 billion. However, 
a further disinflationary impact is promised from government deregulation. This 
aspect of the pol icy is explored below. 
Response.!£_ Deregulation. Government regulation has long been recognized as 
an important contributor to inflationary pressures. Regulation adversely 
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affects economic growth and productivity by discouraging innovative research 
and development, reducing investment in new plants and equipment, raising 
unemployment by increasing labor costs, and decreasing competition. In the 
short run, costs of regulation arise in several other ways. Outlays for a 
bureaucracy to administer and enforce rules lead to higher Federal taxes. 
Compliance costs are incurred by business in the process of, meeting legal 
mandates and require that a firm divert resources from activities that cqntri-
bute to output. · Consumers, because of regulation, thus pay higher prices to 
purchase fewer goods and services. 
The major benefits ~ttributed to regulatory activities include protect-
ing the environment~ promoting health and safety, safeguarding workers and 
consumers, and guaranteeing equal opportunity. Because such benefits are 
often so difficult to accura'tely quantify, arguments can be made that government 
intervention is excessive, that the costs exceed the benefits in many cases. 
When inflation is a serious problem, the attractiveness of these less tangible 
benefits relative to the price increases they entail may fall. Nonetheless, 
just as regulation can be excessive, its reduction can be overdone. Many 
regulations may be unnecessary or may have cheaper, equally effective alter-
natives. All certainly do not. To the extent that deregulation activity 
recognizes this limitation, the scope for permitting output increases or 
price reductions is confined to the subset of mandates that are unjustifiable. 
Assuming reasonable measurement accuracy is possible, extensive cost benefit 
analysis is necessary to identify that subset. 
Figures included in the President's "Program for Economic Recovery" 
provide a reasonably good approximation of the compliance costs the Adminis-
tration believes are unjustifiable. The budgets of the various bureaucracies 
that issue, admfnister, and enforce regulations are to be reduced by about 
29 
u $100 million in 1981 and by about $500 million in 1982. Weidenbaum 
estimates that on average, each dol.lar Congress appropriates for regulation 
tends to result in an additional $20 of compliance costs imposed on the 
23 
private sector. Combining those figures suggests that compliance costs 
of about $2 billion i_n 1981 and $10 billion in 1982 and beyond can be 
el imi~ated. Aggregating those figures indicate that the Administration 
believes a total of about $32 billion in compliance costs can be saved over 
the next four years. 
The ability of deregulation to lower prices and increase output in 
the short run ls further limited by a technical factor. Some of the costs 
that businesses incur to comply ~ith government mandates vary with output and 
' 
some do not. Compliance m~asur¢s 1 ike the acquisition and installatLon of 
capital equipment, say to reduce pol _lution emissions or to enhance worker 
safety, have added a fixed cost to production. The investment of resources in 
attempts to favorably influence the evolution of government controls on 
business might also be viewed as a fixed cost of regulation. In essence, much 
of the compliance costs imposed by regulation have the attributes of a lump-sum 
tax. Therefore, removal of regulations responsible for such lump-sum taxes 
does not change the marginal costs of production. Hence, the most profitable 
24 
short run output of imp~cted firms remains unchanged. Initially, regulatory 
cost savings only enhance the profits of existing firms due to reduced average 
costs. Price reductions and output increases follow only under the pressure 
of competitive entry. The period required for entry can range from a few 
months for small service industries to several years for large manufacturing 
or energy industries. Further, the presence of economies of scale in impacted 
operations can prolong or preclude entry. The point of the argument is simply 
30 
that supply response in the near-term is confined to the ~ubset of regula-
tions that impose variable compliance costs. 
Reinforcing this conclusion is the apparent legislative preference for 
quantitative standards rather than unit taxes in the management of the environ-
ment. The usual justification for standards is that administrative problems 
are greater with effluent taxes. Similar considerations ma~ produce the 
same tendency in other areas of regulation. As already noted, administrative 
costs make up only about one twentieth of measurable regulatory costs. By 
minimizing administrative costs, government probably has not only increased 
the share and size of the burden of regulation on the private sector but also 
has reduced the portion of that burden that can be quickly eliminated by a 
policy change. Like capital stock expansion induced by business tax breaks, 
much of deregulation produce~ output expansion only in the long run. 
The foregoing analysis suggests that the magnitude of the early increase 
in supply due to deregulation must be adjusted to a~count for the fixed 
component of compl lance costs. Weidenbaum reports figures which show that 
over 30 percent of the estimated $82 billion spent by business in 1977 to 
comply with government mandates was for new plant and equipment just to meet 
OSHA rules and environmental requirements. 25 Costs of an equally fixed 
nature certainly form a part of complying with regulations in the areas of 
consumer safety, health, financial disclosure, and personnel practices. 
Unfortunately, fixed share estimates for these costs are unavailable. 
Nevertheless, the information at hand suggests that roughly 70 percent of 
compliance costs are variable and thus would soon be passed on to . consumers 
as price reductions or output expansions following reduced regulation. 
Adjusting the business savings figure of $32 bi 11 ion by the 70 percent factor 
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indicates that it is more reasonable to expect firms to pass on no more than 
$22.4 billion in regulatory cost savings. 
Recall from Figure 6 that labor force participation positioned the 
economy at the intersection of S\ and D\· In Figure 7, we now add the 
output response to deregulation depicted as a shift from ss4 io ss5. The 
remaining gap between QS and Q6 reflects the conclusion thit together, the 
near term supply responses will not offset all of the net spending increases. 
If traditional savings rates hold, the economic recovery program would appear 
to add to inflation. 
Our estimates find that increased savings must offset over one-half of 
the early stimulus of the program. It should be emphasized that this is 
probably a minimum portion since the supply side response presented here has 
been generously estimated. At several steps empirical assumptions most 
• 
favorable to the Administration's case have been made. For example, fixed 
compliance costs incurred by programs other than OSHA and EPA regulations 
are ignored. Of perhaps greater significance are the optimistic assumptions 
associated with labor force participation. 
First, savings claim all of the net income increase from market special-
ization and recreation substitutions. Second, structural constraints which 
may prevent labor from working extra hours at market jobs are ignored. 
Finally, government is assumed to spend only 60 percent of the additional 
tax receipts generated. While this reflects the rate of budget growth 
projected by the Administration, there are numerous exogenous factors which 
would cause outlays to rise endogenously. For example, an adverse supply 
shock such as in poor harvest will affect the CPI causing outlays for indexed 
programs to rise automatically . Obviously, the Admfnistration counts on 
having considerable good luck. In view of these caveats it is proba~ly most 
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realistic to rely on the supply responses carrying significantly less than 
one-half of the anti-inflation burden in the 1982-1984 period. 
Summary and Conclusion 
Over the 1982-1984 period, the "Program for Economic Recovery" proposes 
to inject some $293 . 2 billion extra spending power into the private sector 
of the economy while reducing Federal spending only by $197 billion. Analysis 
in this paper indicates that increased labor force participation and recommended 
deregulation, at best, can offset roughly $81 bill ion of additional spending. 
Due to the multiplier effect, this represents less than one-half of the net 
stimulus. Recent data suggest ~hat neither durable good inventorying nor 
stable tight money policy can be counted upon with complete confidence to 
encourage the necessary adjustment i~ savings. The evidence indicates that 
the disinflationary promise in the recovery program relies on a savings rate 
two to three times historical rates. Furthermore, even 15 to 20 percent 
savings would only prevent an increase in inflation, not reduce it. 
Perhaps the watershed character of the recovery package is enough to 
engender such a savings response. But this response must occur in the face 
of an intriguing paradox. On the one hand, if the tax cut is treated as an 
increase in permanent income, then households may quickly increase their 
level of spending. Alternatively, if inflation continues, and the phenomenon 
of bracket creep coupled with scheduled increases in payroll taxes are widely 
recognized, the tax cuts represent only a temporary increase in income and 
thus might largely be saved. That reaction, however, depends on inflation 
p~shing wage earners into higher tax brackets. Paradoxically, inflation must 
continue, or an added incentive to spend is created! 
Can pure faith in the long term merits of encouraging capital formation 
sustain support for a program that fails to fulfill its short term promise 
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of disinflation? Given the arguments assembled here, the answer to this 
question appears crucial to the ultimate success of the ''Program for Economic 
Recovery . 11 
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FOOTNOTES 
Fiscal.Year 1982: Budget Revisions, March 1981, Office of Management 
and Budget. The estimated tax savings aggregated over those three 
years is $293.2 billion (p. 123) while the aggregate budget savings 
over the same three year period is $197 billion. Savings in both cases 
are defined as reductions relative to the projections of the previous-
administration. 
See for example Donald Regan, Treasury Secretary, as quoted in New York 
Times, January 26, 1981, p. D1. 
The Wall Street Journal, March 24, 1981 cites estimates by Townsend-
Greenspan of a savings rate for the late 1970's of between 9 and 10 percent 
of disposable income, or not quite twice the rate reported by the tommerce 
Department. Receipts from the sale or refinancing of homes have risen 
sharply In inflation. It is argued that resulting appreciation represents 
an addition to both income and savings, providing a large hidden component 
of savings. 
See for example Robert Hall, Chapter 3 in Income Maintenance and Labor 
Supply: Econometric Studies. Edited by Glen G. Cain and Harold W. Watts, 
Chicago, Rand McNally College Pub,. Co., 1973~ T.J. Wales, "Estimation of 
a Labor Supply Curve for Seff-EmpJoyed Business Proprietors,'' International 
Economic Review, Feb. 1973, Vol. 14, #1, pp. 69-80. 
In the context of the comparative static model used, thi~ stimulus is to 
be interpreted as an increase relative to the basic trend in nom1nal 
aggregate demand. Thus, the price level increase depicted is ih addition 
. to the upward price trend or inflation rate existing independent of the 
· policy being discussed. 
See for e~ample W.H. Branson, Macroeconomic Theory and Policy, 2nd Ed., 
Harper & Row, 1979, Chapter 6 or Robert J. Gordon, Macroeconomics, 2nd Ed. 
Chapter 7 for two different derivations of the direct relation between the 
aggre~ate output supplied and the price level in the economy. 
G. Fromm and L.R. Klein, "A Comparison of Eleven Econometric Models of 
the U.S. , 11 American Economic Review, Vol. LXI 11, V2, May 1973, Table 6, 
page 392. The GNP-tax multipliers they cite average from .3 to .9 below 
the GNP-expenditure multipliers, and fall in the range of 1.2 to 2.2 
at peak. An average of l .75 is adopted for our presentation. 
See Steven Rattner's article in The New York Times, March 6, 1981. 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
GNP is projected to grow from $2,629 billion to $4,098 billion by 1984. 
At a target growth rate of 4.5 percent, MIB would increase from $397.8 
billion to $474. ·4 billion. The required increase in velocity would have 
to be from 6.6 to 8.6. Between 197~ and 1~79 VIB (GNP/MIB} increased 
from 5.5 to 6.4 or only by 17- percent. This adjustment occurred 
during a period of rather dramatic revision in the public's banking 
practices, e.g. HOW accounts, Treasury bills, small denomination savings 
certificates, and money market mutuals. 
Thanks to Ray Stone of Fidelity Bank of Philadelphia for pointing out this 
disconcerting evidence and for providing the depiction of it. 
Appearance before the House Ways and Mean~ Committee as reported in 
The New York Times, March 5, 1981. 
Generally, Rutledge's notion of a durable goods inventory cycle appears 
to draw upon L.A. Metzler's c 1 assic investment article "The Nature an.d 
Stability of Inventory Cycles," Review of Economic Statistics, Vol. 23, 
Q, August 1941, pp. 113-129. 
The two decade residual plot obscures the fact that the trend line is 
upward over the whole period, moving from about .25 in 1960 to about 
.43 in 1980. This increase is ~robably largely explained by the rising 
per capita income as well as demographic changes which occurred over the 
period. Also hidden is the fact that the trend flattened out in the ?O's 
relative to the 60's. 
This is the response magnitudi distilled by Steve Collar, University of 
Illinois in his forthcoming dissertation from the sources cited in 
footnote 4 and other more complex studies of labor supply elasticity. 
This probably should be viewed as a maximum response coefficient for two 
reasons. First, the 0.2 percent change is a point elasticity estimate for a 
small 1 percent tax rate change. The tax cut proposals, on the other hand, 
cover a range of 10 percent per year and 30 percent in aggregate. As tax 
cuts raise the price of leisure by large increments, the responsiveness 
of leisure demand may fall signjficantly. Hence, the rate at which the 
last parts of the tax rate reduction stimulate work may fall. Two, a 
concentration of rate cuts in upper income brackets should have less impact 
on work. The incentive to substitute m~rket activity for leisure at high 
income levels can't be as acute as at lower income levels. Technically, 
the income effect is more likely to dominate the sbustitution effect at 
higher incomes. Hence, leisure's attractiveness relative to extra income 
rises as more of the tax cut accrues to high income folk. 
See for example V.A. Canto, D.H. Joines, and A.B. Laffer, 11An Income 
Expenditure Version of the Wedge Model , 11 in the proceedings of 1978 
West Coast Academic/Federal Reserve Economic Research Seminar, pp. 27-59. 
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These percentages are each a geometric average of the rate of outlay and 
receipt growth, respectively, reported in Budget Revisions ... , p. 11. 
Robert Gordon, Op. Cit., pp. 509-10, computes an overall marginal tax rate 
as 11the percentage of any change in GNP that automatically leaks out of 
the spending stream into government tax revenue plus the percentage that is 
automatically injected back into the spending stream in the form of income-
contingent transfers, ... 11 He reports a marginal tax rate of 31.3 
percent for 1975. Applying his computation formula for the years 1976-1980 
yields percentages that average just under 30 percent. 
Regressing manhours (MH) worked on real GNP (RGNP) for the 1960-1980 period 
provides the following equation: MH = 48.717 + 0.08051 RGNP with at= 
60,9 and an R2 of .995. Plugging in the Administration's anticipated 
real GNP for 1981 of $1497 billion, projects 1981 manhours at 169'.24 billion. 
Budget Revisions ... , p. 13. 
Real natural GNP, the level that does not disturb the existing inflation 
rate, grows at about 3 percent a year (Gordon, p. 370). Adjusting 1981 
real GNP by that factor gives a base 1982 real GNP with which to compute 
a base figure for manhours worked in 1982 using the equation from the 
previous footnote. Adding .?7 percent to that and multiplying by the 
nominal output per manhour for 1981· ($2920/169.24) of $17.25 gives the 
net extra output available in 1982 measured in 1981 dollars. Expanding 
that by the Administration's predicted 8.3 percent inflation rate for 
1982 gives net added output that year of $8.72 billion in current dollars. 
MH1982 = 48717 + 0.08051 (1.03) RG'NP198j = 172.86 
~PQ = (172.86 MH) (1.0027) ($17.25/MH) (1.083) = $8.72 billion 
1982 
With an additional 10 percent tax cut in 1983, the total of 20 percent should 
add 0.54 percent to the manhour trend of that year, while adding 0.81 percent 
with the final 10 percent ~ut in 1984. Apply those factors to the base 
manhour . total, multiplying by the 1981 price-level-GNP per manhour, inflating 
at the projected inflation rates of 7 percent in 1983 and 6 percent in 1984, 
and adding permits computation of the aggregate addition to current dollar 
GNP over the 1982-1984 period shown below. 
2 1. MH1983 = 48.717 + 0.08051 (1.03) RGNP1981 = 176.58 
6PQ 1983 = (176.58 MH)(.0054)($17.25/MH)(l.083)(1.07) = $19.06 billion 
2. 3 MH1984 = 48.717 + 0.08051 (1.03) RGNP1981 = 180.42 
APQ1984 = (180.42 MH)(.0081)(17.25/MH)(1.083)(l.07)(1.06) = $30.97 bi I.lion 
(21 continued) 
22 
23 
24 
25 
3. PQ (see previous footnote) 
1982 
= $8.72 bil 1 ion 
$58. 75 bi 11 ion 
. Pro ram for Economic Recovery: Messa e from the President of the U.S., 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., February 1 , 19 1, 
pp. 244-45. 
Murray L. Weidenbaum, Business, Government, and the Public, 2nd Ed. (Prentice-
Hall: Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 1981}, pp. 342-344. 
For a basic treatment of this point see Gould and Ferguson, Microeconomic 
Theory, 5th Ed. (Irwin, Homewood, IL, 1980) Chapter 10. 
Weidenbaum, op. cit., p. 83, p. 98. 
